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DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND
PREVENTIVE LAW:
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR BROWN
E.A.

DAUER* AND

J.D.

NYHART**

Within our discussion of scientific models and the processes of dispute
resolution,' we suggested a single continuum along which the strategies of
Preventive Law and of ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) could be arrayed. Beneath that synthesis lay a proposition which we may not have made
entirely clear: That the two bodies of hitherto separate principles address
problems which are not themselves distinct.
Professor Brown's response 2 would reassert the distinctiveness of the
two fields, though he concludes by agreeing that "[ADR] resembles[s] the
preventive law process." '3 The cogency of his analysis makes it necessary for
us to be more explicit about what we had in mind.
The word "dispute" is a central figure. For Professor Brown, a dispute
necessarily implies the assertion of a legal right arising out of some conduct
(nonperformance, injury, whatever) which took place in the past. "The culmination of dispute is that its termination is ordered by the machinery of
court process." '4 Unless, of course, it is "settled" out of court, through some
procedure such as ADR.
The conventional uses of ADR are consistent with his view: ADR is
most often spoken of as being useful to matters which would be ripe for
adjudication had the ADR not been successful. In such cases we agree with
his Hegelian analogy, the synthesis of which is that unlike litigation an ADR
may consider aspects of the settlement that project performance obligations
or relationships into the future, and that for those aspects of the ambition
of ADR the learning of Preventive Law may be useful.
The point, however, is that we were addressing the potential of ADR
in a broader way. ADR is not only useful to instances of current dispute,
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conventionally defined. As the deep sea mining problem and the proposed
Bay of Fundy project exemplify, 5 ADR techniques are also available for
instances of integrative rather than disputations activity-where the problem
is not one of settling a "dispute" in terms of its potential for adjudicable
claims of legal right, but rather one of entirely forward-looking transaction
building. Consider first an ordinary simple contract. We own a large pizza
and Professor Brown owns a case of beer. The pizza is too much for just
us two, and Brown has more beer than he'll probably drink in the near
future. We make a contract: Two slices of pizza for four cans of beer. And
we are all better off. There was, prior to that contract, no "dispute" in the
ordinary sense. There was, however, a potential claim of legal right. Had
we muscled him aside and tried to steal his beer, Brown could have asserted
a legally protectable right to exclude us from its enjoyment and vice-versa,
of course. The construction of that contract is a matter clearly within the
realm of legal planning, hence within that of Preventive Law.
Consider next a case in which an oil company wishes to construct an
offshore platform on leased sea bottom. Fishermen wish to extract fish from
the same area, a tradition which has until this moment been unchallenged.
The fishing nets, let us suppose, may foul the operations of the drill; and
the platform may alter the behavior of the fish in a way deleterious to the
fishermen. Each party could not simply do what it wished, unhindered by
the claims of the other. The fishermen and the oilmen could trade a portion
of their legal rights (ownership of the pizza; the right to fish in the open
seas) for some return which would be of greater value-a different platform
design; an agreement about the hours when the laying of nets would occur.
We see the two cases as strictly analogous. Neither one is a "dispute"
except insofar as that word might be defined to include the assertion of a
right of ownership which could be violated only by agreement of its owner.
Thus the problem of oilmen and fishermen is not a dispute in the ordinary
sense any more than the pizza-beer contract is.
ADR is relevant to the second case; preventive law is relevant to the
first. Since the two cases are alike, so also are the ambitions of certain
applications of ADR at one with those of Preventive Law. So too with the
law itself: Bargains are possible where property rights exist; property rights
are, at least in contemporary legal systems, rooted in the public protection
of the choice to exclude a use of the property by others. Thus the formation
of every contract implies the assertion of a legal right: "I will exclude you
from the use of this pizza regardless of how much you may want or need
it. Unless, of course, you buy me off with a couple of beers."

5. See, e.g., Baker & Knecht, Fundy Tidal Power in Coastal Zone and
Continental Shelf Conflict Resolution, COASTAL ZONE AND CONTINENTAL SHELF CONFLICT RESOLUTION: IMPROVING OCEAN USE AND RESOURCE DISPUTE MANAGEMENT 121
(Nyhart ed. 1985).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol1986/iss/6

2

Dauer and Nyhard: Dauer: Thesis (Preventive Law), Antithesis (Adversarial Process), Synthesis (Settlement, ADR):

1986]

A REPL Y TO PROFESSOR BROWN

If we move, therefore, beyond the confining connotations of the word
"dispute," there is a theoretical as well as a practical continuum which unites
the legal contributions to bargaining with those of contending. This does not
mean that Preventive Law and dispute processing do not have discrete attributes in practice, nor even in theory. They surely do. What it does mean
is only that there is nothing in the deep structure of bargaining-in-the-shadowof-the-law which requires that they not have an underlying unity, or be on
a common continuum. In the range of problems we were addressing, i.e.
those which deal not with problems ripe for litigation but rather with problems in which optimizing exchanges are possible, ADR techniques can be
extremely valuable simultaneously with the principles of Preventive Law. We
repeat, therefore, our original claim: All contracts, at least potentially, can
define the measures of present exchange (the result of ADR) and establish
the criteria by which future performances may be judged (a goal of Preventive
Law). Hence, it seems quite reasonable as well as theoretically sound to erect
a set of ADR criteria (or, as we called them, "desiderata") which derive
from a unified continuum of possibilities. Whether the unification will also
prove useful, time will tell.
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